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FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1962
8:00P.M., E.S.T.
~GING

EUROPE A'tm UNITED STA'rES

PO~

Address by Se::mtor Mike M!l.nsfield (D. 1 Montane.)
n1e Springfield Adult
Springfield

~~blic

Educe.ti~

Council

Forum, The Philliys Lecture

Technical High School, Spriugfield, Massachusetts
Wednesday, October 10, 1962, 8:00P.M.

w,/1 h!JIIe
Although itAa.m taken an inordinate length of time to
w."/1

complete it, the recordfishow1 that the 87th Cougress has disposed
of a substantial amount of public business.

For this work, it will

be praiseC. or blG.I:!ecl--a.t least until early NovF::mber--d.epend.ir.g in
no srua:U part, I should think, on one's political pree.ilections.
The Congress also failed to get through certain significant items
of business.

And for this, too, it will be praised or blamed, at

least until early November.
In the closing days of the 87th Congress, however, two
maj or measures were cleared.

Praise or

b~ame

and po:itical pre-

dilections : n.otwithstandic.g, these measures are of irr:mense import9.:lcs to the nation.
I refer, first, to the foreign aid appropriation.

We may

deplore this appropriation as a waste of money, as an invitation to
fo~eign

ingratitude or worse.

si e~te d

bumauitarianism or

We may praise it as an act of far-

enlig.~tened

self-interest.

Howe>er we may regard it, there is no escaping the fact
that foreisn aid is a critical geer in the intricate machinery of
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the nation's foreign relations.

It has co:::J.tinued to turn, more or

less adequately, for many years and through several administrations
of both political parties.
the

Cor~ress

It is no overstatement to say that if

had removed the gear or crippled it by denying an ample

appropriation it would have risked bringing down the entire structure
on which the peace and security of the nation has rested for many
years.

Faced with that reality, more than a sufficient

n~ber

of

Senators and Representatives were inclined to the course of prudence
with respect to this program.

Members of beth parties acted to

sustain the security and peace of the United States.
This is not to say that misgivings were absent on the part
of members whc voted for foreign aid.

Many e::1tertained serious doubts

about one or more aspects of the aid-program.

lv1"..a.y I say, in all

frankness, that I personally share some of these doubts.
I do not believe, for example, that we can or should accept
as satisfactory for the indefinite future a course of foreign policy
which places great reliance on a continued outflow of dollar grants
to other nations.

Nor do I believe that we should accept by force

of habit a course of sustaining the independe:::J.ce of nations elsewher e by mai:::J.taining aid-dependent governments in a style to which
they may have become accustomed.

Nor do I beli eve that the long-

range interests of this nation are served by casti::1g aid for the
eco::1omic development of emergent nations, a problem which has a
ratio:::J.ale of its own, in the framework of a competitive struggle
between the United Stat es and the Soviet Union.

- ·3 But t..'le intelligent resolution of these and other doubts
does t::.ot lie in the s·udden smashing of the gear of foreign aid
all that that implies to

t~e

t otal machinery of foreign policy and,

to our peace and security.

he~ce,

wit~

I believe, rather, that we must

look for the resolution of the doubts in a continuing alertness to
the changing realities of the :.nternational sttu.atiou.

We nru.st look

for it in constructive adjustments in the foreign policies by which
we seek to deal with these realitles.

Alld we must look for it,

f i n9.:ly, in a continuous re-ordering of both objective and
tion iu the aid-p:rogram itself, as
ho::ne cl•.ange.
the day

~>rh3n

circumste.i·1c~s

adminis.l~ra

f'llsewhere and at

In these ways we nay a!lticipate, with some realism,
the depende::J.cy of others on th0 more C.ubious e.nd costly

eleme:J.ts of tbe aid.-mechl:l.llism may come to an orderly end.

I:v.deed,

we BB.Y itook forward to the day when the dependency of our mm policies
for peace and security on these same
to

8.!1

du~ious

elements may also came

orderly end.
For this reason, among others, it seems to me that the

Pres ident's new trade policy is the most important act of the recent
session of the Congress.

This first maj or revision of foreign trade

poli cy si:1ce the enactment of the Reci:p:rO·..!al Trad.e Program a quarter
of a ce:::J.t·..u-y ago places i:a the hands of the President authority to
dea:i. ef fecti Yely with recent changes in the pat·cerns of international
trade .

The program has great significance for the

continu.~d

growth

of our own domestic economy, for that growth i s now i n terwovs n

a.n expa.ndi.:g overs e a s tra cl.e.

w~th

But even grea.ter, perb.aps, are t he

p ossibilitie s whi ch are opened by the new trade program for placing

-~

-

our security and well-being on a more stable and equitable and,
hopefully, a less costly basis than that whic:1 now pre7ails.
In this latter

~onnection,

the new trade law bears a

direct relationship to the focus of' tonight's discussion.

It has

particular relevance to Europe, to a changing Europe, and to our
relations with that region.
I have already referred to the need for a continuing
alertness to the evolving situation abroad.

It is essential to

effective foreign policy that we do not imprison ourselves in a
self-fashioned cage of

outwo1~

facts and ritualistic slogans.

Certaiuly, we ought not forget the experiences of the past.

But,

equally, we must be alert to the realities of· the present and try
our best to

cntici~ate

the needs of the

fu~tlre.

This alertness is most essential with respect to

~ape.

For Eurcpe has long been at the core of our foretgn policies, and
Europe is changing rapic.ly.

It is changing, moreover, in ways which

a.re likely to require adjustments in policies on a scale more extensive than a:ny we ha:..re lmovrn in the past decade •
We cannot yet dAfine the

adj~stme~ts

which may be desirable,

possible, or, i::ldeed, inevitable in the years ahead..

Our policies

interact with the policies of other nations and the courses which
they

t~~e

will surely affect our own.

But

~ve

will discern the lines

of adjustment, and we shall have a better chance to formulate effective adjustments as we deepen our understanding of what is presently
transpiring in Europe.

- 5Those of you who have traveled from time to time on that
continent may have been struck by the obvious manifestations of
over the years.

c~ange

Indeed, a great change is readily evident in such

siople matters as the progressive

im~rovement

in the dress of the

people and the worsening of the traffic problems in the major
E1.1!'opean cities.

It is evident in the copious availability of food

and otter consumer goods, in the general intensity of COillli).ercial and
industrial

activi~f.

The present look
or fifteen years ago, is

o~

t~1at

Western Europe, to one who saw it ten
of a booming prosperity.

the economic indicators sustain the
prosperous, and it is dynamic.

ap~arent.

Ana.,

indeed,

Western Europe is

It is producing, investing, trading--

internally and externally--and consuming at uuprecedented levels.
There is a general belief that this dynamism is d.u.e to the
Connnon Market.

T!1e fact is that mucn of the economic momentum wa.s

generated in the European crrwntries on an essentially national but
cooperative basis, even before
into effect .

~~e

Market arrangements began to go

We may anticipate, therefore, that there is much more

to come i f the Coi!ltlon Mark.e t continues to live up to its initial
promise a:x:d, if the cooperative concepts of the Merltet are ex-tended
outward to other nations.
In any event, the atmosphere of Western Europe in 1962 makes
it difficult to recall the Europe of 1945--the devastated Europe,
st·LUJ.ned by long years of privation, by the incredible brutality and
massive destructiveness of the war.
the Europe of 1950 or 1951--the
help of the Marshall Plan.

It is difficult, even, to recall

~~ape

struggling to its feet with the

-9Difficult though it may be, it is essential that we recall
these earlier Europes.

For it was in those settings that our basic

postwar comprehe!lSions of the E1.1ropean si tu.ation were formed, comprehensiO'.lS which persist to some extent even today although circumstances
have changed greatly.
We saw Western. Europe, then, as hurt almost beyond help,
threatened by revol·Lttiona.ry upheaval from within a.nd aggression from
without.

We saw Western Europe dependent on this natiGn for its very

subsistence, let alone t..he revival or survival of its f:::-eedom.

And

after the Berlin blockade, we saw &trope, as a whole, split beyond

any expectation of healing between the monolithic oppressive Stalinist
system in the Fast and the revivtng free nations of the West.

And

we saw, in a divided Germany the wedge of a deepening division in a

nation and a continent.
Throug~out

ably attuned to the

the early postwar years, our policies were reason-

reali"i~ier.

of the Europea!l si taation.

policies which could pro:i:lce mere a.:nd more

ve~.ement

They were

slogans of libera-

tion, more and !!lore speeches in the Congress on liberation, but,
unfortunately, not the act._.a.::.J.ty ot a liberation in Eastern Europe,
as we saw with striking cla.c-:!:cy at the time of the Hungarian uprising.
But they were po::!.icies

w·h~cl':. :

with less end less fanf'are, were appro-

priate to the restoration of !.;estern Germany, the recovery of Western
Europe and to the protection of its renewed vitality and freedom.
Western Europe readily accepted our leadership in those
years.

Cynics might note that the Europeans had little choice.

But

I prefer to think that our leadership was accepted in major part because
it was an understanding ,

effective and responsible leadership.

We

- 7 pursued policies which Western Europeans recognized as serving their
interests and policies rrhich served our own interests, by safeguarding
the security, tile peace, the progress--the essential well-being--of the
people of the United States, at a realistic and bearable cost.
As I have noted, attitudes tend to persist even after the
circumstances which give rise to them have changed.

National policies

and adwinistration are subject at least to the same inertia.

If we

wmlld deal effectively with the Europe of 1962, therefore, we must now
grasp firmly the fact that we are no longer dealing with the Europe of

1945 or 1950. In Western Europe, we are no longer dealing--to be blunt-wi·ch the gaunt and shabby economic dependent, the shocked, tottering
and willing dependent of the earlier years.

On the contrary, Western

Europa , today, is on its feet and has been for several years.

More,

it is running.
Indeed there are certain aspects of the change which has
taken place which border on the ironic.

~uropean

currencies, for

exa.r;:rple, were once in little dE:mand in the international financial
markets .

Some of these currencies are now in relatively greater

demand than our own.

Not so long ago we legislated inducements to

E:ncourage American enterprise to invest in Western :Ela·ope and fmmd
very few takers .

Now we are concerned and properly so by the great out-

flow of American capital to thet region, and we are seeking to stimulate
vlestern European investment in this countr.r as a partial counterbalance.
Once we were badgered for loans by Western Europeans.
we

ha~le

In recent years

been seeking a speedup in repayment of various obligations and

what is more , the Europeans have been repaying in advance.

Once we

- 8 placed abroad, as far as possible, orders for arms ann
other materiel for NATO.

~uniti ons

and

Now, we are pressing the European allies to

make their military purchases irJ. the United States as a means of obtaining foreign exchange to

our military forces in

off~set

the dollar-outflow involved in keeping

~Jrope.

I do not cite these examples in dismay or alarm.
and prosperity of Western Europe were the enQs

w~ich

~1e

recovery

we sought because

our WJ.tione.l in·cerests are interwoYen with these ends.

Moreover, the

interrJ.P..tioD.al financial position of the United States is one of great
reserves and in the past year this position has apparently strengthened.
I cite t'he unusual and ironic t".lrnabouts, rather to indicate the extent
to v/hich ec.:onomic cir'=!w:nstances have ch!:l.nged in Wcster:n Ei.'.:"Ope.
lbe transition has not been

s~dden.

And as it has taken place,

our. policies--sooner or later .. -have genero.lly adjusted to the changes.
Some of the exanrples '¥hich I have just cited are representative of
specific adjustments.

But in more general terms, we might note that

the policies of postwar relief to a stricken Europe, the poetwa.r loans,
the Marshall Plan, have long since passed. into history .

With the excep-

tion of Spain, no economic aiel of any kind. has been extended to Western
Europe for several years.
From one-sided economic aid,

i~

short, we have progressed to

a vastly expanded two-way trade--regular commercial t:::-ade.

This trade

has flourished, and it now encompasses one-third of our total trane,

$5.3 billion in exports to Western Europe, and $4.7 billion in imports
from Western Europe in 1961 .
whic~,

Compare these figures with a pre-war trade

in 1938 stood at $1.2 billion in exports and $474 million in

- "9 imports.
~actor

Apart from its other virtues, the Marshall Plan was a key

in bringing abcut this immensely and mutually advantageous

growth in trade.
It is doubtful, however, that we can coast indefinitely in
this satisfactory situation even if we so desired.

It is not likely

that we shall be able to avoid difficulties in the period ahead in
our relations with Western Europe.

The basic question which is loom-

ing is whether a surge forward in Western cooperation, notably in
trade, is now possible, indeed, necessary.
The major decisions

i~

this connection cannot long be avoided.

Indeed, Western Europe is moving towar ds them largely on a self-generated
momentum.

The Inner Six

countries- ~Ger::nany,

France, Ital:r, Belgium,

Netherlands and Luxembourg--are impelled by the high initial effectiveness of the Cammon Market into a speedup in the removal of economic
impediments as among themselves.

As a group, moreover, they are at a

point at which there wi ll be a signifi,:;ant step forward in the freeing
of trade with nations outside the Market or ti:e heightening of restrictions on that trade.

Moreover, the very success of the Common Market

appears to be serving as a sti!!lt.t,_us to integrated and quasi-independent
European action on other rua . c. -~rs , particularly on the part of the core
nations of Western Gernany a:.:.t F-rance.

And the resolution of the

Algerian question is likely to increase this stimulus.
Britain and other Western European nations linked in the Free
Trade Area commonly called the Outer Seven, are also carried toward
major decisions largely by the significance of the
their trade.

Co~on

Market to

They are drawn by both the great promise and the uncertain

- Hl-

prospects with which the Market confronts them.

And finally, we are

impelled towards major decisions not only by considerations of trade
but because of the key position which all of Western Europe--and a
changing EtiTope--occupies in the structure of policy upon which our
peace and security depends.
We find OQTselves, in short, in a period of major transition in Western Europe during which many questions, economic and more
than econo:n:ic, are appearing and demanding answers.
know all the questions, let alone the answers.

vle

do not yet

For it does not rest

with ·us alone to pose the one or to compose the other.
It is in this context that the action of the Congress in
enacting into law· the President's new trade program assumes great
importance to the nation.

In a most responsible and non-partisan

achievement and by overwhelming vote the Cougress has equipped the
President to deal with the several possibilities which are emerging,
all of which have great significance for the nation's security, peace
and well-being.
It is easy enough to visualize these possibilities in an
optimistic light.

One might look ahead, for example, to the entry of

the United Kingdom and other European nations into the Common Market
or, in other ways, the devising of satisfactory trade arrangements
between the Inner Six e.nd Outer Seven of Europe so that they will not
find themselves at sixes and sevens.

One might look ahead, too, to

the immense possibilities of trade-growth between this nation and all
of Western Europe, through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers,

- 11 -

in the Organization :for Economic Cooperation and Development, under the
General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade and in other ways.
Indeed these optimistic possibilities are now open.

But in

all realism we must recognize that they are not the only possibilities.
In this connection, I would point to the difficulties which have arisen
in the course of British negotiation for membership in the Common Market.
It is understandable that there should be difficulties and cautions on
both sides in these negotiations.

But the hesitancies should not be

dismissed by the glib assertion that it is just a matter of Britain
"wantj_ng the cake and eating it too."

There is more involved- -much more.

And much of what is involved is concerned with the Commonwealth.
We will do well to remember that the Commonwealth, whatever its shortcomi:ilgs, remains a signific&nt factor for restraint and order and the
evolution of freedom in a world which is never far from chaos and filled
with tyranny.
~evised

It is to be hoped, therefore, that arrangements will be

which permit reconciliation of new British ties with Western

Earope with the maintenance of the Commonwealth.

For such a reconcilia-

tion may well decide whether present trends in Western Europe will turn
inward or outward, towards seclusion or inclusion, in the direction of
fragmentation or toward more sffecti ve cooperation among all the free
D.a tions in meeting the worldwide problems of freedom .
If the coming transition in Western Europe will require adjustments in our economic policies it is not unlikely that it will require
adj us t ments in political and defense policies.

Again, it is possible

to view the possibilities in a most optimistic light.

We might assmne,

for example, that the great economic progress of Western Europe might

- 1-2 produce a

stea~v

closing of political as well as economic ranks and the

development of more effective common approaches towards

Easte~

Europe

and the SoViet Union, and towards all the issues involved in a common
advance of freedom throughout the world.

One might also assume the con-

tinuation and deepening of military coopeJation ur1der NATO, with the Europeans bearing an increased share of its costs in manpower and materiel,
commensurate with the improvement in their economic situation.
Yet, we would not see the present situation f ·lzlly if we did
not also note certain tendencies which suggest alternative possibilities.
We must note, for example, that Western policies with regard to China
and other parts of the Far East are by no means parallel policies, let
alone common policies, and the gap vrhich has existed for years shows no
sign of closing.

That may be understandable inasmuch as the Far East

has become increasingly remote from the concern of Western Europe even
as it has co::ne closer to ours .

But near at hand, vre cannot ignore the

fact that the profitable trevie ano. shipping enticements which have existed
since the breakdown in
for some NATO

rue~bers

ot~ relatio~ships

to resist.

with Cuba have proved too much

Again, I suppose one might rationalize

this situation by noting that many of the NATO members are maritime
nations and, as such, have traditional reluctances or legal restraints
against introducing impediments to commerce on the seas, and further,
that Cuba is somewhat remote from their immediate interests.
But even more directly, in the North Atlantic relationship
itself, a relationship in which, presumably, the security and other
interests of the European members are at least equally and probably
more at stake, we cannot fail to notice certain anomalous tendencies.

1

- 13 There are obvious differences over nuclear strategy which far from
being resolved, appear to be deepening.

Further, it is yaars since

NATO established a force goal of thirty divisions in Western Europe.
At the present time, however, there are only twenty-three divisions
in the region, and so far as I am aware, the only increments to its
strength in the past half-decade have come from the United States
and Weat Germany which now supplies half of the European contingent.
This is the case despite the fact that economic growth
Wester~

thro~ghout

Eurcpe would appear to equip the nations of that region to

increase their expenditures for the common defense and permit us to
reduce o".lrs .
In this instance, we are confronted with an almost inescapable

concl~sion

that the Western European allies are either most

lackadaisical about their sGcurity or they see the military threat
to the North Atlantic region or at least to

~lestern

E'urope in a far

different perspective than do we.
This conclusion, moreover, is reinforced by
in the current situation.

~other

anomaly

I allude to it by pointing out that much of

the discussion of foreign policy in the last Congress, as in its predecessors, revealed a

contiw~ed

deep ideological hostility and security

concern with respect to any and all relations with Eastern Europe.

The

Congressional concern included Yugoslavia and Poland despite the fact
the Presidents of botn parties

thro~hout

the years have u:ged a some-

what different approach at Jeast to these two Eastern Europeau nations.
With this exception and despite occasional short-lived efforts
to impro7e the tone of United States-Soviet relations--as for example
during the Geneva Conference of 1955 and when the"Spirit of Camp David"

- 14 prevailed--our relations with Eastern Ecrope have, in fact, been extremely
limited, involving minimal diplomatic
in some instances--trivial trade.

an~

cultural contact and small-scale-

The closed-door situation in the East

European Communist countries, of course, has
tion.

At the tiree the Marshall Plan was proposed, for example, the

Etistern

~~opean

governments under Stalin's dictation isolated themselves

almost completely from contact with the West.
we

been a factor in this situa-

i~osed,

as a matter of policy, our own

But it is also true that

~uasi-~uarantine

with that region and have retained it through the years.

on relations

The principal

motives, ap:9are::1tly, have been a belief that any other cou.rse would
adYersely

affe~t

the security of the West and the hope that

~uasi

q_uarantine would contribute to a liberation of the Eastern European
people from oppressive Communist governments.
In auy eve:at, our policies with respect to Eastern Europe
have involved stringent trade controls for many yecrs.

These controls

have acted to keep our commerce vnth all of the Eastern European
coun triea at a very low level.

Ex.clus i ve of trade with Poland and

Y1.4gosle.v"i.a, it has amounted to U!:l.der <)>1 00 million a year.
great bulk of the $100 mi:i.lio:Q. consists of trade

wi ~~h

Aud the

the So,.riet Union.

By contrast, our commerce with YugoslaYia and Poland, unfolding ur..der a
somewhat eased policy, came to over $300 !!'Jillion ln 1961.
It would reasonable to

ass,~!Ile

Eastern Earope would pre-v-ail a:nong

Qi.lr

that a parallel policy towards
NATO allies .

They are closer

tc the source of danger, sharing the control of the continent with the
Communj_st governments.

Their stake in the security of the West and the

liberation of Eastern Europe would appear at least equal to our own.

- 1$ But we look in vein, if we look for parallel policies.

With the Soviet

Union alone, for example, the trade of the NATO nations of Europe
amounted to over $1.5 billion in 1961.

And the trade of our NATO allies

with Eastern European countries, exclusive of the Soviet Union, in the
same year came to a total of over $2 billion.
Indeed, in the case of West Gei'lliB.IlY, trade with East German,y
has been about $500 million a year for the past five years.

West German

trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to $400 million in 1961, equal
to our total trade with all of Eastern Eurqpe, including Y11goslavia and
Poland.
Moreover, the trade figurE>s are a bare-bones indicator of the
extent of increasing contact between West and East Europe.
a growing

i~tra-Ruropean

tourism.

Add to it,

Add to it, the spread of commercial

aviation networks unt il they embrace both parts of Europe and include
principal European ca:rriers.
available

be~we en M~sc ow

Add to tt the direct rail service now

and Rome, Paris and London.

credit agreements and sea-going shipping

arra~gements

Add to it new
which facilitate

the flow of trade between the two parts of Europe.
What begins to emerge from these and other indicators is a
far different portrait of t l:e all-European situation than that which
prevailed a decade or more ego, the period in which our general comprehensions were formed and our basic political and defensive policies
established.

The contemporary portrait hardly suggests a Western Europe

cowering with fear before the threat of' imminent Soviet invasion, or
subversion from Eastern Europe.

It hardly suggests a Britain, Germany,

France, or Italy which hold that the way to induce change in Eastern

- 1~ ~rope

is to isolate it.

It hardly suggests

W~steru

f i rm or e-ren sta!ldin.g still, i:lsofar as contact with

Europe
Easter~

s tendi~

Et1rope

is concerned.
On the contrery, the current
of a Europe which

~

sit~lation

appears to be that

it may be separated on i1eologica1Jines is

fi udj r.g, through an extensive coi!lii'erce and other contacts, a tolerable
way to live with the division.
thn.t

w~. ich

exis+.ed a.t the time

of Easte!'n Euroue were devised.

This is a far o.ifferent Europe than
01.1r

!>r esent ;poHcies of

gua.si-~t'a.nt:ine

It is a far dHferent Europe than that

which is suggested by the situation in Berlin in 1vhi. ch the Fnited States
and the Soviet Union confront each other in a

continuo~s

state of incipi-

ent conflict.
It is a Europe, i:-:1 short, which appears to ha-re cha.nged
markedly in a decade, except a·c Berlin.

So much has it changed that

it suggests the desirability of a critical examination of both our comprehensions of the situation and the policies which are derived from
them to determine whether both may have fallen somewhat behind the times.
We will not serve our own interests if we cloak the realities of the
present situation j.n the factsand slogans of the pe.st .

Policies per-

sisted in long after ci!'cumstances alter risk irrelevancy or worse.
Certainly, we ought never to approach changes in foreign
policy lightly.

Neither ought we to fear them.

We mu.st always be

prepared to seek them if, in the light of altered situations, changes
may be

i~dicated

in terms of cur own security, peace and well-being.

- lT In the end, it is the President who has the awesome responsibility of decision in these matters.

But I have long believed that any

PresiQent gains from thoughtful public consideration of foreign policy.
Nor is such consideration impossible in this country until after
November, as Mr. Khrushchev appears to think.

Tne questions involved

in our relations with the rest of the world are not political; they are
nstional.

The people of

t~is

nation have long since shown a capacity

to separate the two and, in time, to deal with those in public life who
fail to separate them.

It is with continued confidence in that capacity,

therefore, that I suggest to you some aspects of the European situation
and our policies, which are in need of thorough and dispassionate public
examination.
1.

It does net seem to :me unrflasonalbe, for. ex.ai!Jl?le, to anti-

cipate that the impact cf the economic transition in vlestern Europe is
bound to be felt, not only in

econo~ic

structure of ivestern cooperation.
or:~ce

matters, but throughout the

It seems to me, further, that our

;preuonderant position of responsibility m-ust evolve into a greater

shar~g

of responsibility in line with the diminishing

diff~~~

bet-.reen the basic capacities of the E"cl.J"Opeezls anC. om·selves as the
effect of WorlQ War II on E-u.:;:-ope recedes into his'.:.m·y.
failure of leadership in
essential of leadership.

adjustment~

this reality.

T'r.ere is no
Rather, it is an

It would, indeed, be a failure if -.re were to

cling to an excessive responsibility in Westarn affairs on a mistaken
assumption that nothing has
ferent

tha~

conti~ue.

ch~ged

and the need for us is little dif-

it ever was and that special sacrifices on our part must
I~

that presumptive course lies not only unnecessary tension

but 1:-llnecessary cost a...."ld U!lnecessary risk for the sec'tlri ty of our own
people.

- 18 More suitable to the present, it seems to me, is the course
of a less ritualistic

p~suit

and, at the same time, a more realistic

pursuit of interdependence among the Western nations on the basis of
a more proximate equality of benefit and sacrifice in our relations.
We may begin to find such a course through the new trade program and
a great expansion of trade, not onlY with the Common Market but with
all the Western Eu.rcpea.n nations.

Certainly, that is precisely what

the policy is designed to permit, and I have no doubt that the President will pursue it with vigor.

But we need to be prepared for some

very hard and difficult barc5a.ii:'ling in the days ahead.

We must be pre-

pared to look to our national needs with the same frank concern as do
others.

Unless we are so prepared we may well find ourselves continu-

ing to carry more of the burdens of inte1•dependence while enjoying
less of its benefits.

We will do well, too, to make certain that the

trade interests of Latin America, Japan and other nations with whom
close and fortuitous relations are enjoyed, are not shunted aside in
the effort to strengthen the ties across the Atlantic.
2.

If the beginnings of the adjustments of our course are

to be found in the new trade program, they are not likely to end with
that program.

For, I do not; : hjnk that we can discount for much longer

the existence of Wes tern

Eur<~·ean

concepts of security needs which

differ considerably from our own.

Nor can we ignore the continued

reluctance of Western

Europe~

goveraments to increase their sacrifices

for the common defense in the patterns which were determined some years
a6o·

- :19 ~y

I say the Europeans have an equal right to their views

as to what may presently be necessary to_ their defense, to the common

NA10 defense, and every consideration should be given to their views.
B~t

equally, we have a right and a responsibility to examine the extent

of our commitment to the common defense, particularly in view of the
fcilure to reach the NATO force goals,in view of the consistent balance
of payments deficits which we have experienced for several years, in
view of the expended European capacity to

b~ar

a larger share of the

commcn costs if they were so inclined, and in view of the enormous
burden of assistance which we have carried and are
alone, with respect to other areas of the world.

carryi~g,

largely

It would appear to

me that, at the least, the time is al:>:-eady past due when the remaining
military aid-programs to Western E'..1rope shou.ld follow the economic aid
programs into history.

Nor is it unreasonable to consider

~tion

in our expensive ground-force commitment to Europe--both in manpower
and in dollars--if a reduction might be negotiated for a reciprocal
1·ri t!'ld:raKal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.

Any such reduction

is, of course, inseparable from a sat.is_factory an.d enduring resolution
of the Berlin question.

Otherwise, we would be in the impossible situa-

tion of reducing forces in Europe one oay onl.y to have to increase them
the next.

3. Prospects for
on the situation in Eastern

any such course are also partially dependent
Et~ope.

And it is difficult to speak of the

present situation in that region with any precision.
of information are somewhat limited, to aay the least.

Our public sources
Nevertheless

policies which still derive from an interpretation of that region as

- 21 the Soviet monolith which it was in Stalin's day seem to me to be open
to question.

Certainly, Eastern Eur-ope

Soviet in:'luence.
in the Warsaw Pact.

Certainly,

Commu~1ist

r~me.ins

an area of preponderant

nations of the region are linked

But it is hardly accurate to see the Soviet rela-

tionship with Finland and with Poland in the same perspective; nor is
it valid to equate the Soviet relationship with East Germany and with
Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet relationship with Poland and with Bulgaria,
Rumania or Albania.

Indeed, tb.e latter count:-y has actually severed

diplomatic relations with the

So\~et

Union and sent its military mission

packing!
What ~~."!??.z if anY.:, these a::ld other differences in Eastern
Europe may have to the peace and
open question.

we~a:-e

of the United States is an

But nothing is gained by closing our eyes to the fact

that differences do exist or by regarding as sacrosanct policies which
derive from earlier

ass1u~tions

with regard to the region from the Baltic

to the Black Sea.
On that basis alone, tha policies which we ha.ve purs'l:ed more
or less consistently with all of Eastern Europe except Finland and to
a lesser extent with Yugoslavia and Poland for a decade and a half clearly
require careful scrutiny.

~~e~

we consider, further, that NATO trade

with Eastern Europe has risen to a level of $3.5 billion and other East\vest European relationships have greatly expanded, while we have continued
to maintain a quasi-quarantine, the need for thoughtful review becomes
even more evident.
I would reiterate that prospects for an orderly improvement
of our policies with respect to Europe or, at least, a safe reduction

- 2.1 -

in their burdens on the public, are likely to nrove remote so long as
there is a continuance of the

prese~t

tcncion

i~ Be~lin.

....

It is the policy and, by this ... :ur:e, it should. be clear to
all that it is tne policy of the United States neither to be provoked
into

unnecessa~:y ~~t'

nor to s'..l!'render Allied rights in Berlin to force.

Whatever is neces:=8.ry to assert that policy will be done.
be no

But let there

s.s "to the cost of that si tua.tion to this nation.

mist.a.~te

The

increase of severe.l billions in the <lefense budget in the :!..ast two years
was closely rele.teC. to it.

The call-up of

Nat~onal

Guan1Pwcn and

Reserve co!!IO._SEJ.E_Z_: r.a J e.s t year wa.s dire·.::t;lY related to it.

The grant of

standby authority to the President to do the same this year is related
to it.
I would point out, further, that the rights which we are seeking to

safegua~d

in

responcibili ty a.nl

co~'t_

for

Allied rights even though the principal

~holr:l.:ii.i G...J;h<)m

has besn borne by this nation

It Eeems to m~ ~.hu-tL-~~_::~he li.gl:t ~f the alte::..·ed situation

since 1948.

in Europe, -.,e ;rra;r
is not at lee.st as
as it is of

~he

in view of t::-.e
it has not

B~r~in a~e

properq_t_:1qi1~xe __ wt:~t!!_9r
nrJ:~h

l;ni ted

a respons:!.bili ty of the Germans and the Europeans
8-T:~;. ~_.:>R.

w~

r..'B.y properly inquire, whether or not

c:e.tastroyhi.:__~.::l~l2.i~a.tio:ns

beco~n~,

-r,J.;::_ Ee-:-lin situation today

wbic·h this si tua.tion contains,

to some _::_~t.~:m t, a worldwide

r~onsibility

to share.

It would s.pEear to rr.e that we have every right to insist that
those whose interests nre

a~

least as directly involved as ours bear

more equitabl;y- the risks and "osts wcich are involved.
it would

app~ar

At the least,

to me that they join in an effort to find a rational

alternative to this dangerous and costly si t:•.l8.tion, by such honorable

- :?2 -

means as may be open, be it by

di~~.Pe

i ~ th::."ough the United Nations

or through conferences on Ge:cmaqr at whi•:-.h t !]e Eu?:"opean nt:.tions who may
be prepared to contribtlte, as well e.s Gerllia:l ls, might be ;::>resent.

Indeed,

it is not at &.1:1 in!:L.EJ2ropriate -ljhat both the Unit9d States and the Soviet
Un5.on mo·.."B :f·.l.-rt!.1e:r
selves make a

b ~.cl';:

e:'fort to find answers to the problems posed at

_gr e ~.t~~ r

In. a.ny

i:n such negotia.tions while the .Etzopeans them-

I do not believe that we shoulcl be dissuaded

event~

from seeking more :r::..t.::_,_)r;,a.l
questions by the
of others, so

r-a ~~]-.0:,

long_~~

we

1:i'as ·;;~:r-s

t.o t.he Be:r.lin clilemno. w .d related

eyc·t;:9"rs or the relat:i.vely cost-free reticences
contir.::~e

to bee:.:- the preponderant burden of cost

and res;ponsi'bility.
To s"tB.nd firm while circ'l.l!llStances move on is not to stand
firm at all.

It is to

!~~~~~-i~~o irrelevenc~

or a war of mutue.l anihile.tion.

~L'::J:..'

at home and b·.r allies n.broa d. aB he
a better a·':ls'\.,.er to t!1e dilem:1a.

and a frustrating

Pr es :!.G.ent L'. e serYes to be sustained

e~_e;ages

i::J. a.n Uill'emi tting search for

And the hour is indeed already very

late in Be::..-lin.
I ha-,re discussed t :1ese matters with you, tonight, notwithstanding the fact that the

wl~ds

the political fires of November.

of October have already begun to kindle
I have felt free to do so because

these questions of a changi ng Europe and our foreign policies will be
with us all regardless of the outcome of the election.

- 2·3 Witi1 the
decision.

Preside~t

remains the

awes~~e

responsibility of

He will have to make the decisions--decisions on which

hinge the security, the peace and the well-being of generations.
In all frankness, the decisions which are reached with regard to
foreign policy are not likely to differ significantly whatever the
politieal composition of the next Congress.

In these national

matters, I am confitent that President Kennedy will continue to
have the support of

t~e

preponderance of the membership of Congress,

as did his predecessor.

And I am confident, too, that he will have

the preponderant

of the people of the United States.

su~port

